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INTRODUCTION
This case involves claims brought by Mark Jones ("Jones") and his company,
Mark Technologies Corp. ("MTC"), arising from a Settlement Agreement entered in June
of 1996. Part of the Settlement Agreement, which involved multiple parties and settled
multiple lawsuits, was an accompanying Stock Purchase Agreement under which John
Fife ("Fife") and his company, Inter-Mountain Capital Corp., would acquire a majority of
the outstanding shares of stock in Utah Resources International, Inc. ("URI"). Shortly
after execution of the Settlement Agreement, however, it became apparent to Jones and
MTC that URI, under Fife's leadership, was unwilling to abide by many of the express
terms of the Settlement Agreement. Jones and MTC made a series of demands on URI
and Fife to comply with various terms of the Settlement Agreement and were routinely
met with stonewalling, inaction, or outright refusal. Ultimately, Jones and MTC filed this
lawsuit as a last resort means of obtaining the benefit of what they had bargained for in
the Settlement Agreement.
URI responded to the lawsuit in part by belatedly complying with some of the key
provisions of the Settlement Agreement. After receipt of the Complaint, URI finally
entered a written employment contract-albeit a hasty and incomplete one-with Fife, and
it obtained waivers of certain stock options that were erroneously added in the Settlement
Agreement as being granted to Lyle D. Hurd, Jr. ("Hurd") and Gerry Brown ("Brown").
URI moved to dismiss Jones and MTC's claim regarding its obligation to unwind its
relationship with Morgan Gas and Oil Co. ("MGO") on procedural grounds, and when
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the Motion was denied, it immediately began winding up the relationship, a process that
took less than five weeks.
Ultimately, the matter came before the trial court on cross motions for summary
judgment, and the trial court dismissed the case. Although the trial court's legal basis for
dismissal of each claim was independently stated, the themes of the trial court's ruling
were primarily that Jones and MTC did not have standing to enforce therightsfor which
they had bargained under the Settlement Agreement and that Jones and MTC had suffered
no significant injury, particularly since URI's post-lawsuit actions had rendered the
claims moot.
Jones and MTC have brought this appeal to correct the errors of the trial court in
refusing to acknowledge Jones and MTC's rights under the Settlement Agreement and in
failing to acknowledge the disputed issues of fact presented on the record. Jones and
MTC urge this Court to reverse the Judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for
a trial on the merits as to Claims One through Five, Seven and Ten of the Amended
Complaint.

FACTS RELEVANT TO THE APPEAL
The Statement of the Case set forth in Jones and MTC's principal brief adequately
addresses the factual basis for the Arguments herein, particularly in light of the fact that
URI has not undertaken to controvert any of these facts in its own Statement of the Case.
Therefore, Jones will not restate the facts here, except to respond to a few specific factual
assertions set forth in URI's brief.
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URI dedicates substantial space in its brief to describing the intentions of the
parties in negotiating and signing the Settlement Agreement. This narrative is apparently
offered as support for the proposition that Jones is not a party to the Stock Purchase
Agreement and is not entitled to enforce its terms. Jones and MTC would merely note
that virtually none of the narrative is supported by the record, and that they strongly
dispute the suggestion that they were not intended to have therightto enforce the terms
of the Stock Purchase Agreement that are expressly incorporated in the Settlement
Agreement.
URI also asserts that because each claim of Jones and MTC's Complaint
incorporates all other allegations of the Complaint, all claims of the Complaint are
therefore deemed to arise out of the Settlement Agreement. Jones and MTC are aware of
no authority for the proposition that a reference by which the factual allegations of one
claim are incorporated into another transforms the legal theory and factual basis of one
claim into that of another. Jones and MTC submit that the character of each claim for
relief must be determined from the legal theory upon which the claim is based and the
factual allegations relevant thereto. The fact that other factual allegations of the
Complaint are incorporated as part of the claim is not determinative.
In its brief, URI also discusses the action currently pending in St. George, Utah,
which was mentioned by the Court in dismissing Jones and MTC's Ninth Claim for
Relief. Jones submits that the Ninth Claim for Relief is not a subject of this appeal, and
the St. George action is thus irrelevant to these proceedings.
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Because URI's Statement of the Case does not directly controvert the facts set
forth in Jones and MTC's brief, all factual disputes relevant to the issues on appeal will
be discussed further in the context of the Argument below.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
REGARDING FIFE'S EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.

In its brief, URI concedes that it did not enter a written employment agreement
with Fife until after the lawsuit was filed. URI also concedes, at least tacitly, that but for
the lawsuit, URI would not have entered the written employment Agreement. Instead,
URI defends the trial court's dismissal of the First Claim for Relief on two levels: (1) that
under the plain language of the Settlement Agreement, Jones had no right to sue under the
Stock Purchase Agreement; and (2) that URI's failure to enter a written employment
contract was not a breach.
With regard to Jones and MTC's standing to sue, the Defendants correctly point
out that the Stock Purchase Agreement was between URI and IMC. (Br. 12). Defendants
fail to acknowledge, however, that the purpose of the Settlement Agreement was to allow
interested parties, including Jones and MTC, to establish the terms under which IMC
would be allowed to purchase shares of URI stock. The Stock Purchase Agreement, as
shown by the Settlement Agreement, was in part the culmination of the lawsuit contesting
the sale of URI. To portray the Stock Purchase Agreement as independentfromthe
Settlement Agreement contorts the plain meaning of the Settlement Agreement and does
-4-

not comport with Jones and MTC's intent concerning the consideration they bargained
for in negotiating the Settlement Agreement.
To support their position, URI cites to State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1996)
and Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1993) which URI claims stand for the
proposition that where a plaintiff can make no showing of injury, he has no standing to
sue. However, URTs analysis fails to acknowledge the axiomatic principal of contract
law that where a party to a contract does not receive the performance bargained for, he
has standing to sue to enforce the contract.
Moreover, even if URI's theory were accepted on its face, URTs brief fails to
complete the analysis, addressing only the first prong of what is actually a three-part test.
The first step of the test is to assess whether the plaintiff has been adversely affected,
and whether there is a causal connection between the adverse affect, the Defendant's
actions, and the relief requested. Mace, 921 P.2d at 1379. While URI directs its attack at
this step of the test, Jones and MTC submit that the adverse effect they have suffered is
that they have not received the benefit of what they bargained for in the Settlement
Agreement. The Defendants' alleged actions are the breach of that Agreement, and the
relief requested is enforcement of the contract, or in the alternative, an award of actual or
nominal damages, together with an award of attorneys fees. The causal connection
between the injury, Defendants' conduct, and the remedy requested is thus apparent.
Even if standing were not found under the first step of the test, however, the
inquiry would not end. The Court would then analyze whether anyone else would have a
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"more direct interest in the issues who can more adequately litigate the issues." Id. In
this case, the only party in a better position to enforce the rights of the parties under the
Settlement Agreement would be John Fife. As he is a defendant and the very officer of
URI whose conduct has given rise to the current dispute, the Court may conclude that no
other party is in a better position to enforce therightsof the parties to the Settlement
Agreement.
Finally, if there are no better litigants, the third step is to decide whether the issues
raised by the Complaint are of sufficient importance to justify standing on their own
merits. Id. In this case, the issues raised concern the performance of obligations clearly
undertaken in a written Settlement Agreement. Jones and MTC submit that the
importance of enforcing written agreements justifies allowing Jones and MTC access to
the courts to pursue enforcement of the various agreements at issue.
Beyond the standing issue, URI also seeks to justify the trial court's ruling by
arguing that URI did not in fact breach its obligations with regard to the employment
contract. First, URI espouses the position that the mere inclusion of a clause requiring a
written agreement in the final Stock Purchase Agreement fully satisfied URI's obligations
under the Settlement Agreement. Jones and MTC submit that this logic eviscerates the
Settlement Agreement of all meaning. Indeed, if the logic of the Trial Court were applied
to the other clauses expressly enumerated for inclusion in the Stock Purchase Agreement,
URI could have avoided paying the first year's interest at closing (para. f(iv)), securing
the Note by a pledge of IMC s URI stock (para. f(v)), having Fife personally guarantee
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the Note (para. f(vi)), and so forth. Such was clearly not the intent of the parties to the
Settlement Agreement, and such was certainly not what Jones and MTC bargained for in
accepting and executing the Settlement Agreement.
In this same vein, URI has made much of the fact that it has at least nominally
complied with the requirement of hiring John Fife under a written employment contract.
However, the record is clear that no such contract was entered until after Jones and MTC
filed their lawsuit. Defendants attempt to obscure their failure to comply with the terms
of the Stock Purchase Agreement by characterizing Jones and MTC's claim as one
limited to displeasure concerning the timing of compliance only. Such is not the case.
While Jones was on the Board of Directors of URI, he made repeated requests for URI to
comply with the requirement of entering a written employment contract with Fife. His
requests were met with silence and refusal. It was only in response to Jones and MTC's
lawsuit that any action was ever taken.
Defendants finally assert that their conduct with regard to the employment contract
is protected under the "business judgment rule." That position fails for two reasons.
First, the business judgment rule does not apply to contract claims. The rule protects
corporate officers from "errors or mistakes in judgment pertaining to law or fact where
they have acted on a matter calling for the exercise of their judgment or discretion, when
they have used such judgment and have so acted in good faith." Financial Industrial
Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 474 F.2d 514, 519 (10th Cir. 1973). It
simply does not protect corporations or their boards from the consequences of breaching
-7-

contracts. Second, to the extent the rule has any application to the facts of this case, the
issue of URI's "good faith" would certainly be called into issue. The factual record
contains substantial evidence of Jones' demands to URI to comply with the contract, and
URTs persistent refusal to do so throughout the period. It is difficult to imagine how
URTs obstructionist tactics in refusing to comply with the nondiscretionary requirements
of the Settlement Agreement and Stock Purchase Agreement could be viewed by any
court as constituting "good faith" as a matter of undisputed fact.
In summary, URI obligated itself to enter a written employment agreement with
Fife. Despite the persistent demands of Jones that it do so, URI brazenly refused to do so
until after being served with this lawsuit. The Court erred in dismissing this claim on
summary judgment, and the Judgment should be reversed in this regard and remanded to
the trial court for adjudication on the merits.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
REGARDING THE WINDING UP OF URTS RELATIONSHIP WITH
MGO.

The parties do not dispute that the Settlement Agreement obligated URI to use
"best efforts" to unwind the MGO relationship. The parties also agree that the MGO
relationship was not wound up until August 1, 1998, when MGO's president verbally
approved a written proposal made by Fife. Despite the fact that this "winding up" did not
occur until more than two years after execution of the Settlement Agreement, the trial
court found that URI presented "uncontroverted evidence that it had been in the process
of unwinding the partnerships identified in the Settlement Agreement." The principal
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thrust of URI's brief on the subject has been to restate this purportedly incontroverted
evidence, which consists primarily of self-serving statements of URI principals regarding
the complexity of the MGO relationships and the need for investigation before anything
could be done.
Jones and MTC submit that the trial court simply erred in failing to consider the
substantial evidence presented to controvert URI's assertions. That evidence is described
in detail on page 21 of Jones and MTC's principal brief, and will not be restated here.
Jones and MTC would emphasize, however, that sufficient inferences to raise a disputed
issue of fact as to URI's exercise of "best efforts" can be drawn from the simple fact that
the entire process of winding up the relationships did not begin until immediately after
the Court denied URI's initial motion to dismiss the claim in June of 1998, and the
process was completed within five weeks. Neither the trial court nor URI has ever
offered an explanation why this fact, together with the catalog of direct and
circumstantial evidence produced by Jones and MTC, is not sufficient to call into dispute
the factual question of whether URI had exercised its best efforts to unwind the
relationships.
In its opening brief, URI focuses on the meaning of "best efforts," and cites cases
from the New York Court of Appeals and the Fifth Circuit where summary judgment was
entered on a "best efforts" claim. URI then argues that the fact that it made some efforts
was sufficient to constitute "best efforts" as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court,
however, has held that even significant efforts undertaken by a party may not rise to the
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level of having used "best efforts." Olympus Hills Shopping Center, LTD v. Landes, 821
P.2d 451, 455-56 (Utah 1991). See also Sinajini v. Board ofEducation of the San Juan
School District, 233 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that while "best efforts"
does not obligate one to accomplish the task, it does constitute an enforceable legal
standard). The determination of whether a party has met the standard of using "best
efforts" is a factual inquiry reaching into subjective intent, similar to inquiries into good
faith and specific intent. United Telecommunications, Inc. v. American Television and
Communications Corp., 536 F.2d 1310, 1317 (10th Cir. 1976). Such inquiries into intent
and motive are factual judgments generally inappropriate for summary judgment. See
Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders International Union v. Rollison, 615 F.2d
788 (9th Cir. 1980).
Jones and MTC submit that even if the Court were to accept URTs sketchy
assertions that during the two years following the Settlement Agreement it was
"investigating" the partnerships and "identifying" the assets of the partnerships and
"taking steps" to wind things up, a fact finder may nevertheless infer simplyfromthe
timing of events that URI had failed to use best efforts. But the evidence in this case goes
even further. Jones has presented substantial evidence calling into question whether URI
had in fact done anything during that time period, including specific testimony that Fife
expressly refused to consider paying money to MGO, even though he knew that payments
may be necessary to wind up the relationships. Jones and MTC submit that in the case
the fact finder must not only resolve the factual dispute concerning what URI actually
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did, but it must then measure that conclusion against the language of the Settlement
Agreement and determine whether the acts constitute URTs "best efforts" to unwind the
relationships.
Jones and MTC contend that the trial court erred in rejecting substantial evidence
showing that URI failed to use its best efforts to unwind the MGO relationships. The
evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom, particularly when viewed in a light
favorable to Jones and MTC, present a disputed issue of fact that cannot properly be
resolved on summary judgment. The Judgment of the trial court on this claim should be
reversed and remanded to the trial court for a determination at trial.1
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DISMISSING THE STOCK OPTION CLAIMS.

The arguments set forth in URTs brief with respect to the stock option claims are
adequately addressed in Jones and MTC's principal brief. Jones will not restate that
argument here except to address briefly URTs assertion that Jones and MTC suffered no
cognizable injury. Jones and MTC would point out that the law does not require any
actual injury as an element of a contract case. A contract case is proven upon evidence of
contract and breach. Where no actual damages have resulted, nominal damages are

1

URI also argues that the relevant provision of the Settlement Agreement was not
intended to benefit Jones and MTC and that they are therefore not entitled to sue to enforce the
provision. This assertion is not supported by any reference to case law or any limiting language in
the contract. Jones and MTC submit that as parties to the Contract, they may sue to enforce its
terms, and if the breach at issue has not resulted in any actual or substantial damages, they may
recover nominal damages. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667
(Utah 1982).
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awarded to enforce the terms of the contract. Turtle Management, Inc. v. Hagis
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982). In simplest terms, where URI has
breached its contract with Jones and MTC, the fact of the breach itself is all the injury
that need be proven in order for Jones and MTC to prevail.
In its brief, URI weaves its discussion of "injury" into a further discussion of the
business judgment rule. As set forth above, however, the business judgment rule does not
excuse breaches of contract. Moreover, where the business judgment rule essentially
calls for a "good faith" test relative to the conduct of URI in honoring the contract, the
record does not support a holding that such "good faith" was established as a matter of
law.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING JONES AND MTC'S
CLAIMS FOR PAYMENT OF EXPENSES.

The argumentation in URTs brief on the subject of Jones' unreimbursed expenses
focuses primarily on the quality and the quantity of evidence presented on the subject.
By its very nature, the discussion betrays the trial court's error in granting summary
judgment in the face of factual record that gives rise to substantial issues of fact.
With regard to the settlement expenses addressed in Jones and MTC's Fifth Claim
for Relief, the parties do not dispute that only "pre-settlement" expenses are payable.
Jones and MTC have submitted substantial sworn testimony of Jones and numerous handwritten business records establishing their claim that certain pre-settlement expenses
remain unpaid. In fact, the court tacitly acknowledges that Jones presented at least some
-12-

evidence of pre-settlement expenses by noting that "some of the costs submitted for
reimbursement include expenses incurred after closing." On summary judgment, the
evidence that there were at least some unpaid pre-settlement expenses should have been
accepted in a light most favorable to Jones and MTC, and the Court should have drawn
all inferences from that evidence in Jones and MTC's favor. Tretheway v. Miracle
Mortgage, Inc., 995 P.2d 599 (Utah 2000). It was error for the trial court to ignore this
evidence and its inferences, and hold that there were no unpaid expenses as a matter of
law.
With regard to the directors expenses, the parties do not appear to dispute that
Jones incurred substantial expenses as a director of URI that were not reimbursed. The
factual question at issue was whether URI had a policy in place that denied
reimbursement unless expenses had been pre-approved. Not surprisingly, URTs
principals all testified that URI had such policy, and that Jones was not entitled to
reimbursement. The trial court agreed, and held that Jones had "not produced any
evidence" to the contrary, and URTs brief merely reiterates this assertion.
From Jones and MTC's perspective, the mystery of this matter is the fact that
neither the trial court nor URI have ever offered an explanation why Jones' affidavit
testimony, sworn out on personal knowledge as a former director of URI, may be
disregarded on this issue. Without rehashing the facts set forth in the principal brief,
Jones testified that he was a director and that there was no policy requiring pre-approval.
He also testified that he personally observed that expenses of other directors were
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routinely paid without pre-approval of any kind. In short, Jones offered substantial
evidence that controverted, both directly and by inference, URTs evidence relating to
reimbursement of director expenses.2
As a general rule, "[a] single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of
fact." Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1985) quoting,
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). Moreover, on summary judgment, the court
may not weigh the evidence or assess credibility, but must view all evidence and draw all
inferences in a light favorable to the non-moving party. Id. In this case, it was simply
error for the trial court to find that Jones' testimony was insufficient to outweigh the
evidence offered by the URI principals.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING $162,028.87 OF COSTS
AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE DEFENDANT.

In the principal brief, Jones and MTC raise three issues with regard to attorneys
fees. First, Jones & MTC argue that to the extent that the Third, Fourth, and Seventh
Claims for Relief Judgment were dismissed on grounds of mootness, Jones was in fact the
prevailing party. URI has responded to this argument primarily by questioning use of the
term "mootness," and then by insisting that the stock options at issue were never

2

Without citation to the record, URI asserts in its footnote 5 that Jones' testimony in this
regard is made uon information and belief." A review of the affidavit, the relevant parts of which
are at pages 1102-1103 of the record, reveals that all allegations relating to this matter were made
on personal knowledge.
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exercised and had never been declared "valid or enforceable in the first instance." URI
Brief, at 27.
It is Jones and MTC's position that inclusion of the Stock Options in schedule 2.2
of the Settlement Agreement constituted recognition of the options as valid and
enforceable. Jones and MTC made due demand on URI to cancel the options, and URI,
Hurd, and Brown refused to cancel or disclaim their rights under the options. On the day
the lawsuit wasfiled,therefore, URI, Brown and Hurd all recognized the options as valid
and enforceable. Only after the lawsuit was filed did Hurd and Brown agree to disclaim
the options. In fact, Hurd and Brown disclaimed their options expressly in response to
the lawsuit.
It is clear that the trial court based its dismissal of the stock options claims in
substantial part upon its view that because Brown and Hurd had waived their interest in
the options, "the issue would be moot". (R. 1520). Jones and URI apparently disagree
with the trial court's use of the term "moot," but they offer no evidence that absent the
lawsuit, Brown and Hurd would have waived their options. Jones and MTC submit that
if the stock option claims are dismissed based exclusively on Brown and Hurd having
now waived their rights, then Jones and MTC must be deemed the prevailing parties since
URTs compliance resulted from the filing of the lawsuit. As such, Jones and MTC
should be awarded fees, and not URI.
Second, Jones and MTC have argued that the fee award should be allocated among
the claims, with no recovery allowed for the claims on which recovery was imavailable or
-15-

for issues on which URI did not ultimately prevail. As to the claims where recovery was
unavailable, Jones and MTC have argued that their Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Claims for
Relief are not founded on contract, and are therefore not subject to the attorneys fees
provision of the Settlement Agreement. Defendants rely on Dejavue, Inc. v. US. Energy
Corp, 993 P.2d 222,227 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) for the proposition that factually related
claims, when prevailed upon, form the basis for awarding attorneys' fees on all the
claims. However, Dejavue requires that the claims arise from "a common core of facts
and involve[] related legal theories." Id, quotingDurant v. Independent Sch Dist. No.
16, 990 F.2d 560, 566 (10th Cir. 1993). Furthermore, full recovery depends on the party's
success on a "significant, interrelated claim." Id_, quoting, Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d
1505, 1512 (10th Cir. 1995).
In the case at hand, the claims at issue share neither a common set of facts nor
related legal theories. Plaintiffs' Claims One through Five and Seven all arise from the
Settlement Agreement and Stock Purchase Agreement and allege a breach of contract.
Claim Six arises from the settlement of the lawsuits predating the Settlement Agreement
and alleges that the Defendants made fraudulent representations to induce Jones and
MTC to enter the Settlement Agreement. It is based on misrepresentation and arises in
tort. Claims Eight and Nine allege breaches of fiduciary duties of various URI officers,
and sound in tort. Claim Ten is a separate claim based on the facts and circumstances
surrounding URI's failure adequately to reimburse Jones for expenses he incurred as in
service on the URI Board of Directors. This claims has nothing to do with the Settlement
-16-

Agreement or the Stock Purchase Agreement. Jones and MTC submit that the trial court
erred in refusing to allocate the fees among these claims and adjust the fee award
accordingly.
With respect to Jones and MTC's assertion that URI should not recover fees
incurred pursuing unsuccessful issues, the parties agree that Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961
P.2d 305 (Utah 1998) is perhaps the most pertinent Utah case on the subject, but differ as
to interpretation of that case. Jones and MTC submit that the discussion in the principal
brief is sufficient to state their position on the matter, but would emphasize that in
Valcarce, the court expressly held that it was error to award the full amount of fees where
some of the time was spent pursuing unsuccessful issues. Id. at 318.
Jones and MTC's third argument relative to the fee award is that the trial court
failed to adjust the fees charged by URI's Chicago counsel to reflect reasonable billing
rates in Utah. URI's brief suggests that term "in the locality," as used in Barker v. Utah
Public Service Commission, 970 P.2d 702 (Utah 1998) has not been defined by the Utah
Supreme Court, and argues that the term should be construed broadly to allow attorneys
practicing in Utah to charge rates that are reasonable in the locality of their home office.
Jones and MTC submit that a fair reading of Barker requires that the term "in the
locality" be given its plain meaning of in the locality of the Court where the action is
pending.
URI suggests that Utah's open court policy would dictate that out-of-state
attorneys be allowed to recover fees at their out-of-state billing rate. However, Jones and
-17-

URI would submit that requiring out-of-state attorneys to submit to reasonable local
billing rates is no more of a burden than is requiring such attorneys to be admitted to
practice in the state, and to agree to abide by the local rules of professional conduct and
rules of the court. In short, Jones and MTC contend that Barker requires courts to adjust
billing rates of out-of-state counsel to meet the standard of reasonableness for the Salt
Lake market. Since this was not done in this case, the award should be vacated and
remanded for a new determination.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in their principal brief, Jones and MTC request
that the Summary Judgment granted against them be reversed, and the matter be returned
to the trial court for further proceedings.
DATED this r / / r day of March, 2002.
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.

At
Laiijbert\|

Attorney for Jones and MTC
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